Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem

If earlier‐than‐necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later‐than‐necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non‐existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non‐existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution . In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non‐existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non‐existence. Even if both types of non‐existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non‐existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions. 1 1 For helpful discussion and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Kurt Blankschaen, Ben Bradley, Yishai Cohen, Jenni Ernst, John Martin Fischer, Frederik Kaufman, Gerald Marsh, Jeff McMahan, Hille Paakkunainen, Derek Parfit, Doug Portmore, Nate Sharadin, David Sobel, and my audience at the University of Miami. I am also greatly indebted to the anonymous referees who read this paper and whose detailed and insightful comments significantly improved the final product. Work on this paper was supported by the Immortality Project at the University of California Riverside, funded by the John Templeton Foundation.