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Why indeterminate probability is rational |
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| Authors: | Isaac Levi |
| Institution: | Columbia University, USA;Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, CA 95616-8578;School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada Simon Fraser University 8888 University Drive Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada School of Computing Science Simon Fraser University 8888 University Drive Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada;LAMSADE, Universite Paris-Dauphine, Place due Marechal de Latrtre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16;Institut für Philosophie, Universität Regensburg, 93040 Regensburg, Germany |
| Abstract: | This essay has two objectives: (1) To offer a general motivation for the use of sets of probabilities to represent states of credal probability judgment. Doubt as to which of rival answers to a given question is true is representable by the set of potential answers that have not ruled out as impossible. Doubt concerning probability is representable by the set of probability distributions over potential answers that are not ruled out as impermissible to use in delibration. (2) To defend a more specific thesis that the set of permissible probability distributions ought to be convex. |
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