Moore's Paradox And Self-Ascribed Belief |
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Authors: | Byeong D. Lee |
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Affiliation: | (1) Seodaemum-Gu, Bukahyun-Dong, Dusan Apts 104-1002, Seoul, South Korea, 120-795 |
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Abstract: | Moore's paradox arises from the logicaloddity of sentences of the form`P and I do not believe that P'or `P and I believe that not-P'. Thiskind of sentence is logically peculiarbecause it is absurd to assert it, although it isnot a logical contradiction. In this paperI offer a new proposal. I argue that Moore's paradox arises because there is a defaultprocedure for evaluating a self-ascribed belief sentence and one is presumptivelyjustified in believing that one believes a sentence when one sincerely assents to it. |
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