Suspended judgment |
| |
Authors: | Jane Friedman |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ, UK
|
| |
Abstract: | In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|