Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism |
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| Authors: | Liam Dempsey Itay Shani |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Lady Eaton College, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, K9J 7B8, Canada;(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, South Africa |
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| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body. |
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| Keywords: | Autonomy Consciousness Downward causation Epiphenomenalism Non-reductive identity Self-organization The ontological argument for consciousness epiphenomenalism The out of-the-loop argument for consciousness epiphenomenalism |
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