从现象学角度看佛教因明中的遮诠问题

笔者在此提出并尝试论证以下三个命题：其一，应当区分佛教因明中与为他比量相关的“遮诠”方法以及可以运用在整个量论领域的“遮遣”方法。具体地说，“遮诠”只是“遮遣”的一种，即专指运用于概念语言领域的遮遣方法。其二，现象学本质直观思想的提出，消解了量论中现量与比量的严格区分，并可以导致对感知、思维、判断、推理、自相、共相、概念、语词等范畴的重新理解。其三，表诠一遮诠方法、连同整个因明，在中国佛教史上乃至在整个佛教史上始终发展不兴，很大原因在于它们被人为地限定在语言层面。

The Problem of Apoha in Hetu-vidya from a Phenomenological Perspective

Since Dignaga, hetu-vidya, pramana., vijnapti-matrata and other theories in Buddhism have all employed the term apoha to explain the forming of concepts. It has similarity with the phenomenological method of eidetic reduction by which we get ideas. But it also makes a noteworthy contrast, mainly because Dignaga is a nominalist, while Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, is an idealist. Therefore, their results are different despite the similarity in method. Under this background, the author puts forward and＇ tries to argue three theses as follows： first, distinction should be made between the method of ayapoha that is related to express comparative inference in Hetu-vidya, and the method of apoha that can be applied in the whole sphere of praman.a. Specifically ayapoha is only one kind of apoha, i. e. , the method of apoha specially applied in the sphere of concept and language. Second, the thought of seeing an essence advanced by phenomenology dispels the strict distinction between pratyas a-prama.na and anuma.napramana, in pramana., and can lead to a re-understanding of perception, thinking, judgment, inference, particular, universal, concept, words and other categories. Third, the main reason why the method of affirmation-negative exposition （ayapoha） as well as the whole Hetu-vidya hasn＇t flourished in the history of Chinese Buddhism even Buddhism in general, is that they are limited to the level of language. Although there is considerable difference between Dignaga＇s nominalism and Husserl＇s idealism, it is also an obvious fact that there are comparability and complementarity between them. In this sense, Husserl＇s phenomenology is no more Cartesianism in twentieth century than Dignagaianism in twentieth century.