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Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason
Authors:H Lillehammer
Institution:(1) The University of Reading, Whiteknights, Reading, RG6 6AA, UK
Abstract:This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
Keywords:practical reason  normative reasons  response dependence  dispositionalism  normative realism  metaphysical revision
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