A consistent way with paradox |
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| Authors: | Laurence Goldstein |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Cornwallis Building NW, Canterbury, Kent, CT27NF, UK |
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| Abstract: | Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes
within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist),
avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes
and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
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| Keywords: | Paradox Consistent Cassationist Liar No– no Buridan |
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