Authority in Relationships

Abstract

Authority consists in having standing to make a claim on another person’s actions. Authority comes in degrees: persons have the authority to make moral demands on each other, but if they participate in close relationships, such as friendships or love relationships, their authority over each other is greater, compared to the authority of strangers to make demands, as participants in personal relationships can demand more from each other than can strangers. This paper discusses the phenomenon of a relationship-dependent greater authority on a conceptual level. It thereby fills a gap in the literature on the proper theory of authority: while being a common part of our moral practice, relationship-dependent authority has mostly been neglected in this context. It is even doubtful whether the most influential contemporary accounts of authority can accommodate it. As will be argued, neither Joseph Raz’s service conception nor Stephen Darwall’s second-personal conception of authority are able to. The triggering-reasons account of authority, as recently developed by David Enoch, is better suited in this regard: according to this conception, relationship-dependent authority stems from special conditional reasons that are implied by relationships and that can be triggered by the authoritative demands of their participants.