Skepticism and elegance: problems for the abductivist reply to Cartesian skepticism |
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Authors: | Matthew B. Gifford |
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Affiliation: | 1. University of Massachusetts Amherst, 377 Bartlett Hall, Amherst, MA, 01003, USA
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Abstract: | Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated. |
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