Experimentation on humans and nonhumans |
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Authors: | Evelyn B. Pluhar |
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Affiliation: | (1) Professor of Philosophy, Penn State Fayette, The Eberly Campus, One University Drive, P.O. Box 519, Uniontown, PA 15401, USA |
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Abstract: | In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation. |
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Keywords: | argument from marginal cases experimentation homocentrism moral agents moral rights sentient beings speciesism utilitarianism |
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