Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality |
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Authors: | Bernard Molyneux |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 26 Nichol Ave, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA |
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Abstract: | Williamson (2000) Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites
for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson’s arguments and use
Twin-Earth style cases to argue for the causal inertness of broad mental states. |
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Keywords: | broad mental explanation externalism generality internalism knowledge narrow mental prime primeness williamson |
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