MIND‐INDEPENDENCE AND THE LOGICAL SPACE OF WRIGHT'S REALIST‐RELEVANT AXES

This paper continues the work begun by Crispin Wright of identifying, articulating, and explaining the relations between various realist‐relevant axes that emerge when it is conceded that any predicate capable of satisfying a small range of platitudes is syntactically and semantically adequate to count as a truth predicate for a discourse. I argue that the fact that a given discourse satisfies the three realist‐relevant axes that remain if evidence‐transcendent truth and reference to evidence‐transcendent facts are ruled out by Dummettian meaning‐theoretic considerations is not sufficient for what I have elsewhere called “modest metaphysical realism.” I conclude that mind‐independence marks yet another realist‐relevant axis and explore the relationships between the proposed mind‐independence axis and the realist‐relevant axes identified by Wright.