Distribution of the cost of maintaining common resources |
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| Institution: | 1. Center for Alcohol and Addiction Studies, Brown University, United States;2. Colby College, Department of Psychology, United States;3. Department of Behavioral and Social Sciences, Brown University School of Public Health, United States;1. Cultural Anthropology, University of Oulu, PO Box 1000, 90014, Finland;2. Department of Forestry and Renewable Forest Resources, Biotechnical Faculty, University of Ljubljana, Vecna pot 83, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia;3. Social, Economic and Geographical Sciences Group, The James Hutton Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen AB15 8QH, UK;4. Social, Economic and Geographical Sciences Group, The James Hutton Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen AB15 8QH, United Kingdom;5. Natural Resources Institute Finland (LUKE). Eteläranta 55, 96300 Rovaniemi, Finland;6. Information and Computation Sciences Group, The James Hutton Institute, Craigiebuckler, Aberdeen AB15 8QH, United Kingdom;7. Institute of Ecological Economics and Management, Ukrainian National Forestry University, Gen. Chuprynky St. 103, Lviv 79057, Ukraine;8. European Forest Institute, St. Pau Art Nouveau Site - St. Leopold Pavilion, St. Antoni Maria Claret, 167, 08025 Barcelona, Spain |
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| Abstract: | In an experiment simulating management of a common forest, members of four-person groups planted seedlings and harvested trees as they grew. Half of the 36 groups was assigned the equality rule according to which costs for planting seedlings were equally assigned to all members, and the other half was assigned the punishment rule according to which costs were assigned only to the member who harvested the largest number of trees. This rule factor was crossed with the voting factor (voting vs. no-voting). In the voting condition, group members could vote during the latter half of the experiment for one of the above two rules. It was predicted that equality-assigned groups would experience the devastating consequences of defective actions so that they would vote for the punishment rule more than would punishment-assigned groups which would not experience such devastating consequences. Results for the experiment supported this prediction. Results also indicated that adoption of the punishment rule improved post-voting profits of equality-assigned groups. |
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