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The Negative Effect of Probability Assessments on Decision Quality |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Occupational and Public Health, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada;2. Department of Population Medicine, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada;1. Department of Medicine, Division of Cardiology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota;2. Department of Cardiovascular Medicine and the Heart and Vascular Institute, Kaufman Center for Heart Failure, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio;3. Methodist DeBakey Heart and Vascular Center, Houston, Texas;4. University of Minnesota Division of Biostatistics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota;5. Department of Medicine, Division of Gastroenterology, Hepatology, and Nutrition, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota;6. Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery, Division of Surgery, University of Minnesota, Minnesota |
| Abstract: | It is commonly assumed that uncertain information can be reduced to numerical probabilities without biasing preferences. It is also implicitly assumed in much research and many applications that people can express these probabilities. In contradiction to these assumptions Experiment 1 shows that the production of probability assessments biases decisions in an n-person game. Experiment 2 shows that the explicit assessment of numerical probabilities renders choices between gambles concerning future basketball events less optimal. These findings seem to be a result of overweighting the probability dimension relative to the payoff dimension given numerical judgments. Experiment 2 also suggests that without explicit numerical probability judgments subjects are less likely to violate the dominance principle. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed. |
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