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Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments
Authors:Cushman Fiery  Knobe Joshua  Sinnott-Armstrong Walter
Affiliation:a Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
b Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA
c Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, USA
Abstract:An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping diverse cognitive representations across multiple domains.
Keywords:Moral judgment   Doing and allowing   Intentional action   Omission bias
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