| Abstract: | Contextual theories of judgment assume that the rating of any stimulus depends on its relationship to a context of similar stimuli. For example, any specific act of behavior would be rated less favorably when considered in the context of good behaviors then when considered in the context of bad ones. However, two experiments suggest an absolute anchoring of the natural neutral point, an exception to this generalization. In Experiment 1, morally indifferent acts remained “neutral,” regardless of context; and in Experiment 2 the break-even or zero-point in a simulated game of chance was always rated “neutral.” In both experiments, contextual manipulations had powerful effects upon ratings of other stimuli, though never shifting them across the neutral point. Furthermore, both experiments suggest that neutral-point anchoring also affects the use of the most extreme categories in a manner that is unique to this phenomena. In Experiment 2 for example, the introduction of extremely positive “wins” not only made other wins seem less favorable while leaving ratings of the zero-point unchanged, but also made the most negative losses seem more favorable. It is as if the introduction of an extremely positive “win” also introduces the possibility of an extremely negative “loss.” Taken together these findings contradict the basic adaptation-level premise that the entire scale is determined by the neutral point; they are also inconsistent with the assumption of range theories that the scale is anchored by the endpoints of the range of stimuli actually experienced. |
