首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

现象学伦理学的基础:意向性感受
引用本文:张伟. 现象学伦理学的基础:意向性感受[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2009, 4(1): 130-142. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-009-0008-3
作者姓名:张伟
作者单位: 
摘    要:

关 键 词:现象学  伦理学  意向感受  价值  胡塞尔  舍勒
收稿时间:2006-07-15

The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings
Wei Zhang. The foundation of phenomenological ethics: Intentional feelings[J]. Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2009, 4(1): 130-142. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-009-0008-3
Authors:Wei Zhang
Affiliation:(1) Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275, China
Abstract:E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation. Translated by Yu Xin and Zhang Wei from Huazhong keji daxue xuebao 华中科技大学学报 (Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology), 2007, (6): 14–20
Keywords:phenomenology  ethics  intentional feelings  value  Husserl  Scheler
本文献已被 万方数据 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号