Bothsiderism |
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Authors: | Aikin Scott F. Casey John P. |
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Affiliation: | 1.Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA ;2.Philosophy, Northeastern Illinois University, Chicago, IL, USA ; |
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Abstract: | This paper offers an account of a fallacy we will call bothsiderism, which is to mistake disagreement on an issue for evidence that either a compromise on, suspension of judgment regarding, or continued discussion of the issue is in order. Our view is that this is a fallacy of a unique and heretofore untheorized type, a fallacy of meta-argumentation. The paper develops as follows. After a brief introduction, we examine a recent bothsiderist case in American politics. We use this as a pivot point to survey the theoretical literature on the fallacy. The most prominent theory is that bothsiderism is a case of dialogue-shifting. This view fails, we maintain, to explain how bothsiderism might be persuasive. We argue, rather, bothsiderism is a kind of meta-argumentative fallacy. |
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