Realization, determination, and mechanisms |
| |
Authors: | Matthew C Haug |
| |
Institution: | (1) College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Several philosophers (e.g., Ehring (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 30:461–480, 1996); Funkhouser (Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 40:548–569, 2006); Walter (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37:217–244, 2007) have argued that there are metaphysical differences between the determinable-determinate relation and the realization relation
between mental and physical properties. Others have challenged this claim (e.g., Wilson (Philosophical Studies, 2009). In this paper, I argue that there are indeed such differences and propose a “mechanistic” account of realization that elucidates
why these differences hold. This account of realization incorporates two distinct roles that mechanisms play in the realization
of mental (and other special science) properties which are implicit, but undeveloped, in the literature—what I call “constitutive”
and “integrative” mechanisms. I then use these two notions of mechanism to clarify some debates about the relations between
realization, multiple realizability, and irreducibility. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|