Husserl on Scientific Method and Conceptual Change: A Realist Appraisal |
| |
Authors: | Belousek Darrin W |
| |
Institution: | (1) Program in History and Philosophy of Science Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Husserl claimed that all theoretical scientific concepts originate in and are valid in reference to 'life-world' experience
and that scientific traditions preserve the sense and validity of such concepts through unitary and cumulative change. Each
of these claims will, in turn, be sympathetically laid out and assessed in comparison with more standard characterizations
of scientific method and conceptual change as well as the history of physics, concerning particularly the challenge they may
pose for scientific realism. The Husserlian phenomenological framework is accepted here without defense, and hence the present
project is limited to the task of asking what can and cannot be accommodated within that framework on its own terms.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|