Davidson on the Impossibility of Psychophysical Laws |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">G?L?HersteinEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 4505, IL, 62901, U.S.A |
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Abstract: | Donald Davidson s classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidson s argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility. |
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