Translucent experiences |
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| Authors: | A D Smith |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, Arts B, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9QN, UK |
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| Abstract: | This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent
public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the
objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general
objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
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| Keywords: | Perception Blurred vision Transparency Representationalism |
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