Inconsistency in the A-Theory |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Nicholas?J?J?SmithEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Main Quadrangle A14, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia |
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Abstract: | This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment)
and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore
want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which
the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to
be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and
appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the
A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less. |
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Keywords: | |
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