Representation and Regress |
| |
Authors: | Maiya Jordan |
| |
Affiliation: | 1.Department of Philosophy,McGill University,Montreal,Canada |
| |
Abstract: | I defend a Husserlian account of self-consciousness against representationalist accounts: higher-order representationalism and self-representationalism. Of these, self-representationalism is the harder to refute since, unlike higher-order representationalism, it does not incur a regress of self-conscious acts. However, it incurs a regress of intentional contents. I consider, and reject, five strategies for avoiding this regress of contents. I conclude that the regress is inherent to self-representationalism. I close by showing how this incoherence obtrudes in what must be the self-representationalist’s account of the phenomenology of experience. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|