Uniqueness and symmetry in bargaining theories of justice |
| |
Authors: | John Thrasher |
| |
Institution: | 1. 213 Social Sciences, University of Arizona, 1145 E. South Campus Drive, P. O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ, 85721-0027, USA
|
| |
Abstract: | For contractarians, justice is the result of a rational bargain. The goal is to show that the rules of justice are consistent with rationality. The two most important bargaining theories of justice are David Gauthier’s and those that use the Nash’s bargaining solution. I argue that both of these approaches are fatally undermined by their reliance on a symmetry condition. Symmetry is a substantive constraint, not an implication of rationality. I argue that using symmetry to generate uniqueness undermines the goal of bargaining theories of justice. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|