Bringing cumulative technological culture beyond copying versus reasoning |
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| Institution: | 1. Laboratoire d’Étude des Mécanismes Cognitifs, Université de Lyon, 5 avenue Pierre Mendès France, 69676 Bron Cedex, France;2. Institut Universitaire de France, 1 rue Descartes, 75231 Paris Cedex 5, France;3. Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, LPC, 3 Place Victor Hugo, 13331 Marseille, France;4. IRCCS Synlab SDN S.p.A., Via Emanuele Gianturco 113, 80143, Naples, Italy;1. Institute of Health, School of Health Sciences, HES-SO Valais-Wallis, Sion, Switzerland;2. The Sense Innovation & Research Center, Sion and Lausanne, Switzerland;3. Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV), MySpace Lab, Lausanne, Switzerland;4. Department of Neurology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Hamburg, Germany;5. Cognition, Motion and Neuroscience, Italian Institute of Technology, Genoa, Italy;1. School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney 2006, Australia;1. Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK;1. Department of Psychology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel;1. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AZ, UK;2. Computational Neuroscience Laboratories, ATR Institute International, 619-0288 Kyoto, Japan;1. Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, 78464, Konstanz, Germany;2. Max-Planck Institute of Animal Behavior, 78315, Radolfzell, Germany |
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| Abstract: | The dominant view of cumulative technological culture suggests that high-fidelity transmission rests upon a high-fidelity copying ability, which allows individuals to reproduce the tool-use actions performed by others without needing to understand them (i.e., without causal reasoning). The opposition between copying versus reasoning is well accepted but with little supporting evidence. In this article, we investigate this distinction by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence indicates that the ability to reproduce others’ tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which questions the copying versus reasoning distinction and the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. We conclude that new insights might be gained by considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture. |
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