Constitutivism and Transcendental Practical Philosophy: How to Pull the Rabbit Out of the Hat |
| |
Authors: | Sorin Baiasu |
| |
Institution: | 1.Philosophy Programme, School of Politics, Philosophy, International Relations and Environment,Keele University,Keele,UK |
| |
Abstract: | Constitutivism aims to justify substantial normative standards as constitutive of practical reason. In this way, it can defend the constructivist commitment to avoiding realism and anti-realism in normative disciplines. This metaphysical debate is the perspective from which the nature of the constitutivist justification is usually discussed. In this paper, I focus on a related, but distinct, debate. My concern will not be whether the substantial normative claims asserted by the constructivist have some elements, which are not constructed, but real, given independently from us; instead, my concern will be more narrowly epistemic – whether those claims can be derived from premises, which are normatively less substantial than the normative conclusions themselves. I focus on Korsgaard’s transcendental articulation of the constitutivist argument. I conclude that more work would need to be done, in order for this argument to function as intended. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|