Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem |
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Authors: | Carla Bagnoli |
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Affiliation: | 1.Department of Linguistic Studies and Cultures,University of Modena,Modena,Italy;2.Department of Philosophy, Classics,History of Art and Ideas University of Oslo,Oslo,Norway |
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Abstract: | According to the standard objection, Kantian constructivism implicitly commits to value realism or fails to warrant objective validity of normative propositions. This paper argues that this objection gains some force from the special case of moral obligations. The case largely rests on the assumption that the moral domain is an eminent domain of special objects. But for constructivism there is no moral domain of objects prior to and independently of reasoning. The argument attempts to make some progress in the debate by defending a robust conception of construction, which names a distinctive view of practical reasoning as transformative. |
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