A strategy for assessing closure |
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Authors: | Peter Murphy |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Indianapolis, 1400 East Hanna Avenue, Indianapolis, IN 46227, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge
is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy
in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all
the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According
to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument
for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the
conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge
is closed. |
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Keywords: | Brueckner defeaters Dretske epistemic closure principle reliabilism safety sensitivity transmission principle Warfield |
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