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The informational basis of social judgments: Memory for informative and uninformative arguments
Authors:Yaacov Schul  Eugene Burnstein
Affiliation:The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Israel;The University of Michigan USA
Abstract:This study investigates the encoding and retrieval of arguments in an opinion formation task. It is based on a model of opinion formation that partitions the latter process into initial encoding, elaborative encoding, integration, and decision. According to this model elaborative encoding depends on two factors: (i) the informativeness of the arguments and (ii) their thematic relatedness. Since it is reasonably well established that the likelihood of retrieving an argument is an increasing function of the amount of elaboration performed on it, the first hypothesis is straightforward, namely, that the memory for an argument will increase with its informativeness and with its thematic relatedness to other arguments. The second hypothesis assumes that by dint of their closer association with the decision, informative arguments occupy a more central position in the representation of an opinion than uninformative ones. This implies that an informative argument should be accessed and reported prior to an uninformative argument, even when differences in retrievability (i.e., probabilities of recall) are controlled. The findings were consistent with such an analysis.
Keywords:Address reprint requests to Eugene Burnstein   Research Center for Group Dynamics   Institute for Social Research   University of Michigan   Ann Arbor   MI 48106   or to Yaacov Schul   Department of Psychology   The Hebrew University of Jerusalem   Jerusalem   Israel.
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