| Abstract: | Chirimuuta's view and my own are as close as they are because we both take two quite controversial stances: pragmatism as against a correspondence‐based view of perceptual success, and adverbialism as against a representational view of color experience. Unsurprisingly, of course, we do not understand these positions in precisely the same ways. In these comments I would like to see if I can persuade Chirimuuta to take two steps in my direction. The first step is to broaden her pragmatism so that it treats truth and accuracy in similar ways, for belief as well as perception, and for all sorts of properties. The second is to narrow her adverbialism so that it applies only to the fine‐grained appearances of the colors, and leaves aside the coarse‐grained colors themselves, which seem to remain as constant properties of objects, even as their appearances change. |
