Two Versions of the Conceptual Content of Experience |
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Authors: | Daniel E Kalpokas |
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Institution: | 1. Instituto de Humanidades, CONICET/UNC, Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Córdoba, Argentinadkalpokas@gmail.com |
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Abstract: | ABSTRACTIn ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, McDowell revisits the main themes of Mind and World in order to make two important corrections: first, he does not longer believe that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in character; second, he does not believe now that the content of an experience needs to include everything the experience enables us to know non-inferentially. In this article, I take issue with both retractions. My thesis is that McDowell’s first version of perceptual content is preferable to the latest one. |
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Keywords: | McDowell propositional content conceptualism intuitional content reason |
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