Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of Authenticity |
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Authors: | Sven Bernecker |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-4555, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity. |
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