| Abstract: | Recent critical attempts to modify or replace attribution theory have focused particularly on two issues: the relationship of the reason—cause distinction to attribution theories and actor/observer differences in attribution, and the emphasis in attribution theories on inferential, as opposed to self-presentational, processes. In dealing with these two issues, some critics also point out ethnocentric and ideological influences on attribution theories. The issues raised are important, as both intentional (reason) explanations and self-presentational factors have been under-represented in attribution theories. But the new attempts to build these factors into theories of lay explanation are not wholly satisfactory. Authors make several stipulations about reasons and causes that are unsupportable, and they employ arguments about differences between actors and observers that are unsatisfactory in other respects. Nonetheless a number of their claims can be reconceptualized and supported by using definitions and parameters that do not confound the variables being examined. Claims that attribution theories have ignored self-presentational factors underestimate the extent to which self-presentational factors are being examined in attribution studies, but the proposition that self-presentational factors account for most aspects of explanations is unconvincing. Authors are also mistaken to assume that ethnocentric or ideological factors are particular to attribution theories. The errors, exaggerations and other difficulties in the authors' arguments do not nullify the attempt to expand or transcend attribution theory. Where flaws in the arguments are pointed out, alternative ways of tackling the same issues are referred to or proposed. |
