Metacognition in psychophysical judgment: An unfolding view of comparative judgments of mental workload

An experiment is reported in which it was found that when subjects were required to indicate which of two visual extents was more difficult to categorize as “long” or “short,” they executed these categorizations and then measured the distance of the representation of each stimulus from the long-short category boundary; the stimulus nearer the boundary was judged to be the more difficult. When they were requested to indicate which was easier to categorize, they selected the alternative that was farther. Coombs’s theory of data (1952, 1964) and his unfolding theory of preferential choice (1950, 1964) provided the conceptualization of metacognition in this psychophysical task context. Strong support for the probabilisitic version of unfolding theory was obtained from the observed selective effects of laterality on the levels of stochastic transitivity attained for various classes of triples and the reliably longer times for comparisons with bilateral pairs than with unilateral pairs. The semantic congruity effects obtained, together with the changes in the form of the relationship between probability and response time as a function of practice, can be best accounted for by an evidence accrual theory in which the distances from the active reference point are measured and compared with a criterion on each evidence accrual. No support is provided for the view that propositionally based semantic “ease”- “difficulty” codes serve as the basis for these metacognitive comparative judgments of ease and difficulty.