Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation |
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| Authors: | Angela Mendelovici |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Coombs Building 9, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia
2. The University of Western Ontario, The Rotman Institute of Philosophy, London, Canada
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| Abstract: | It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them. |
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