The Easy Approach to Ontology |
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Authors: | Amie L Thomasson |
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Institution: | (1) University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA |
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Abstract: | This paper defends the view that ontological questions (properly understood) are easy—too easy, in fact, to be subjects of
substantive and distinctively philosophical debates. They are easy, roughly, in the sense that they may be resolved straightforwardly—generally by a combination of conceptual
and empirical enquiries. After briefly outlining the view and some of its virtues, I turn to examine two central lines of
objection. The first is that this ‘easy’ approach is itself committed to substantive ontological views, including an implausibly
permissive ontology. The second is that it, like neo-Fregean views, relies on transformation rules that are questionable on
both logical and ontological grounds. Ultimately, I will argue, the easy view is not easily assailed by either of these routes,
and so remains (thus far) a tenable and attractive approach.
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Keywords: | Ontology neo-Fregean Metaontology Metametaphysics Existence |
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