Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle |
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Authors: | Erik Carlson |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
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Abstract: | John Broome has argued that incomparability and vagueness cannot coexist in a given betterness order. His argument essentially hinges on an assumption he calls the ‘collapsing principle’. In an earlier article I criticized this principle, but Broome has recently expressed doubts about the cogency of my criticism. Moreover, Cristian Constantinescu has defended Broome’s view from my objection. In this paper, I present further arguments against the collapsing principle, and try to show that Constantinescu’s defence of Broome’s position fails. |
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