Cheap talk and credibility: The consequences of confidence and accuracy on advisor credibility and persuasiveness |
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Authors: | Sunita Sah Don A. Moore Robert J. MacCoun |
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Affiliation: | 1. Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business, United States;2. Harvard University, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, United States;3. University of California, Berkeley, United States |
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Abstract: | Is it possible to increase one’s influence simply by behaving more confidently? Prior research presents two competing hypotheses: (1) the confidence heuristic holds that more confidence increases credibility, and (2) the calibration hypothesis asserts that overconfidence will backfire when others find out. Study 1 reveals that, consistent with the calibration hypothesis, while accurate advisors benefit from displaying confidence, confident but inaccurate advisors receive low credibility ratings. However, Study 2 shows that when feedback on advisor accuracy is unavailable or costly, confident advisors hold sway regardless of accuracy. People also made less effort to determine the accuracy of confident advisors; interest in buying advisor performance data decreased as the advisor’s confidence went up. These results add to our understanding of how advisor confidence, accuracy, and calibration influence others. |
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Keywords: | Judgment Confidence Advisors Influence Accuracy Credibility Calibration |
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