Mackie on Practical Reason |
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Authors: | David Phillips |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204-3004, USA |
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Abstract: | I argue that John Mackie’s treatment of practical reason is both attractive and unjustly neglected. In particular, I argue
that it is importantly different from, and much more plausible than, the kind of instrumentalist approach famously articulated
by Bernard Williams. This matters for the interpretation of the arguments for Mackie’s most famous thesis: moral scepticism,
the claim that there are no objective values. Richard Joyce has recently defended a version or variant of moral scepticism
by invoking an instrumentalist theory like Williams’. I argue that this is a serious strategic mistake.
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Keywords: | Instrumentalism Mackie Moral skepticism Practical reason Richard Joyce Williams |
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