The folk on knowing how |
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| Authors: | John Bengson Marc A Moffett Jennifer C Wright |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station, C3500, Austin, TX 78712, USA;(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming, 1000 E. University Avenue, Laramie, WY 82071, USA;(3) Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, 1000 E. University Avenue, Laramie, WY 82071, USA |
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| Abstract: | It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind.
Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless.
Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent
with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability,
but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the
folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case
against neo-Ryleanism.
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| Keywords: | Ability Anti-intellectualism Intellectualism Know-how Over-intellectualization Praxism Propositional knowledge Understanding |
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