Different Games for Different Motives: Comment on Haesevoets,Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) |
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Authors: | Isabel Thielmann Robert Böhm Benjamin E. Hilbig |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Psychology, University of Koblenz‐Landau, Landau, Germany;2. Center for Doctoral Studies in Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany;3. School of Business and Economics, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany |
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Abstract: | Recently, Haesevoets, Folmer, and Van Hiel (2015) strongly questioned the comparability and equivalence of different mixed‐motive situations as modelled in economic games. Particularly, the authors found that different games correlated only weakly on average and loaded on two separate factors. In turn, personality traits failed to consistently account for behavioural tendencies across games. Contrary to the conclusions of Haesevoets et al., these findings are actually perfectly in line with the game‐theoretic understanding of the different economic games. If one considers the variety of specific motives underlying decisions in different games, Haesevoets et al.'s findings actually support the validity of different games rather than questioning it. This, in turn, emphasizes the necessity for the plethora of different games that have been developed over decades in economics and psychology. Copyright © 2015 European Association of Personality Psychology |
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