Dualisms,Dichotomies and Dead Ends: Limitations of Analytic Thinking about Sport

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines.

To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ‘broad internalism’ engaged in by Russell (1999 Russell, J. S. 1999. Are rules all an umpire has to work with?. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXVI: 27–49. Taylor & Francis Online] , Google Scholar], 2004 Russell, J. S. 2004. Moral realism in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 142–160. Taylor & Francis Online] , Google Scholar]), Dixon (2003 Dixon, Nicholas. 2003. Canadian figure skaters, French judges, and realism in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXX: 103–116. Taylor & Francis Online] , Google Scholar]), Simon (2000 Simon, Robert. 2000. Internalism and internal values in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXVII: 1–16. Taylor & Francis Online] , Google Scholar], 2004 Simon, Robert. 2004. From ethnocentrism to realism: Can discourse ethics bridge the gap?. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 122–141. Taylor & Francis Online] , Google Scholar]) and Morgan (2004 Morgan, William. 2004. Moral antirealism, internalism, and sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 61–83.  Google Scholar]). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ‘mind from nowhere’. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities.