Memory and epistemic conservatism |
| |
Authors: | Matthew McGrath |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of philosophy, 438 GCB University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 65211-4160, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memory. |
| |
Keywords: | Rational belief Memory Knowledge Justification Epistemic conservatism |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|