The Negotiated Allocation of Benefits and Burdens: The Impact of Outcome Valence, Contribution, and Relationship

This laboratory study investigates negotiated allocations of benefits and burdens. We compare both the distributive and integrative aspects of negotiation to determine whether benefits and burdens are allocated according to the same norms of distributive justice and how well negotiators integrate their interests. We hypothesize that the distribution of resources depends on the valence of the resources and negotiators′ relative contributions to those resources. We also expect that the efficiency of agreements depends on the valence of resources, the negotiators′ contributions, and the time horizon of their relationships. Results support the hypotheses. Equity is more commonly used to allocate burdens than benefits; agreements for allocating burdens are less integrative than those for benefits; and agreements are more efficient when relationships are long term and subjects contribute unequally to the resources being allocated than when they contribute equally or relationships are short term. We discuss these results in terms of Taylor′s (1991) hypothesis about the asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events.