On what will be: reply to Westphal |
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Authors: | Chris Heathwood |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, 232 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309-0232, USA |
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Abstract: | Jonathan Westphal’s recent paper attempts to reconcile the view that propositions about the future can be true or false now
with the idea that the future cannot now be real. I attempt to show that Westphal’s proposal is either unoriginal or unsatisfying.
It is unoriginal if it is just the well-known eternalist solution. It is unsatisfying if it is instead making use of a peculiar,
tensed truthmaking principle.
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Keywords: | Westphal Time Temporal ontology Eternalism Truthmaking future contingents |
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