Attributions restore consistency in bargaining with liked/disliked partners

The experiment deals with the impact of self-esteem and liking for the partner on the attribution of agreement and deadlock in bargaining. Fifty-eight male and 70 female students played the Harsanyi-Selten bargaining game with incomplete information eight times, allegedly each time with a randomly selected partner. In fact in four games a computer program simulated the partner. Combining an experimental variation of liking (liking—disliking), own costs (low, high), partner costs (low, high) the experiment followed a 2×2×2 repeated measures design. As predicted by a path model from balance theory (a) failure (deadlock) was attributed more to the partner and less to self than success (agreement), (b) success was attributed more to the liked than the disliked partner, whereas failure was attributed more to the disliked than the liked partner.