The contours of control |
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Authors: | Joshua Shepherd |
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Affiliation: | 1. Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, University of Oxford, 16/17 St Ebbes Street, Littlegate House, Suite 8, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK
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Abstract: | Necessarily, if S lacks the ability to exercise (some degree of) control, S is not an agent. If S is not an agent, S cannot act intentionally, responsibly, or rationally, nor can S possess or exercise free will. In spite of the obvious importance of control, however, no general account of control exists. In this paper I reflect on the nature of control itself. I develop accounts of control’s exercise and control’s possession that illuminate what it is for degrees of control—that is, the degree of control an agent possesses or exercises in a given circumstance—to vary. Finally, I demonstrate the usefulness of the account on offer by showing how it generates a solution to a long-standing problem for causalist theories of action, namely, the problem of deviant causation. |
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