Cooperation with leaders in social dilemmas: On the effects of procedural fairness and outcome favorability in structural cooperation |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Experimental Psychology, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands;2. Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands;1. Department of Radiation Oncology, centre Lucien-Neuwirth, 108 bis, avenue Albert-Raimond, BP 60008, 42271 Saint-Priest-en-Jarez cedex, France;2. Department of Medical Oncology, centre Lucien-Neuwirth, 108 bis, avenue Albert-Raimond, BP 60008, 42271 Saint-Priest-en-Jarez cedex, France;3. Department of Radiation Oncology, hôpital d’instruction des armées du Val-de-Grâce, boulevard de Port-Royal, 75013 Paris, France;1. Gillings School of Global Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA;2. Hussman School of Journalism and Media, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA;3. Boston Children''s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;1. University of Nottingham, School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom;2. IZA, Bonn, Germany;3. CESifo, Munich, Germany;4. University of Bonn, Institute for Applied Microeconomics, Adenauerallee 24-42, Bonn 53113, Germany;1. School of Psychology, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China;2. Research Institute of Moral Education, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing, China |
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| Abstract: | The present research examined the effectiveness of leadership in influencing cooperation in social dilemmas by focusing on the procedural fairness and favorability of leaders’ outcome decisions. We predicted that leader’s influence on cooperation would be determined by the fairness of the procedures used, but only so when received outcomes were unfavorable. Across two experimental studies, support for this hypothesis was found. Both in Study 1 (using accuracy as a manipulation of procedural fairness) and Study 2 (using voice as a manipulation of procedural fairness), it was found that procedural fairness influenced contributions in a public good dilemma only if outcomes were unfavorable (i.e., participants received less than an equal share), whereas procedural fairness did not influence level of contributions when outcomes were favorable (i.e., participants received more than an equal share). |
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